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INTRODUCTION

Issue classes have gained steady traction over the last few
years as plenary class certification has become more difficult.
By focusing on a defendant's uniform conduct, issue classes
can capture and adjudicate collectively what is truly common
to all the people affected by the same acts or omissions. 1 But
funding quandaries hamper the issue class's utility. Plaintiffs'
attorneys may be reluctant to request issue certification even
in multidistrict litigation where they might prove most useful,
in part because of the uncertain nature of attorneys' fees. 2 Unlike plenary classes or settlement classes, issue classes are
uniquely situated because they do not immediately produce a
common fund from which successful class counsel can recover.

* Copyright © 2016 by Elizabeth Chamblee Burch. Charles H. Kirbo
Chair in Law, University of Georgia School of Law.
1. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Constructing Issue Classes, 101 VA L.
REv. 1855, 1871-81 (2015) [hereinafter Burch, Constructing Issue Classes].
This is true at least insofar as a defendant's conduct toward plaintiffs is nonindividuated. Id. at 1875.
2. Id. at 1905.
889
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Although courts might turn to charging liens and the
3
common-benefit doctrine for sound compensation analogies,
those doctrines still require plaintiffs' attorneys to shoulder an
enormous amount of risk. That risk is compounded in the
multidistrict-litigation context when issue-class counsel must
split fees with individual claimants' attorneys who resume case
control upon remand. Remand scenarios, while rare, could require issue-class counsel to entrust the resolution of individual
cases to attorneys with whom they may not be familiar and
then fight to collect fees in dispersed jurisdictions.
Enter alternative legal financing. Third-party financiershedge funds, venture capitalists, and private investors-can
bridge the gap with a greater ability to play the long game,
aggregate financial incentives across plaintiffs' law firms, and,
in multidistrict litigation, follow through on collections if a
case is remanded. But third-party funding faces substantial impediments too.
As the literature and lore surrounding alternative financing conveys, sentiments often fall into one of two camps: financiers are either knights in shining armor galloping in on a
white horse to assist David in taking down Goliath or the new
wolves of Wall Street with their sights now set on commodifying our legal system. 4 The truth, of course, is far more
nuanced. If nothing else, this study in contrasts reveals that
financiers have a long way to go before achieving mainstream
acceptance. Judges, for example, typically regard funders with
marked skepticism, concerned that they turn attorneys into
puppets. 5 That general concern turns specific in class actions,
where settlement "consent" turns on adequate representation
and a failure to opt-out, not on traditional acceptance.

3. Id. at 1908-14.
4. See Mattathias Schwartz, Should You Be Allowed To Invest in a Lawsuit?,

N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/
magazine/should you be allowed-to-invcst-in a law3uiLhtml?_r-0.
5. See, e.g., Public Opinion Strategies, National Judges Survey, at 6
(Nov.-Dec. 2013), http://masonlec.org/site/rteuploads/files/LEC%2ONa
tional%20Judges%2OSurvey%20Interview%2OSchedule%2OPerformed%20
by%20Public%200pinion%20Survey%2ONovember%2ODecembcr%202013
.pdf.
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Despite the skeptics, the third-party financing industry
continues to grow and flourish. 6 Not only is alternative legal
funding well positioned to alleviate financing concerns in issue
classes, but, if the relationship is structured such that the financier's incentives align with the class members' interests,
then funders might likewise alleviate principal-agent
problems. 7 What remains to be seen, however, is whether industry insiders are willing to deviate from their current funding models to realign their interests with absent class members
and build the goodwill necessary to gain a toehold in the
United States' class-action market. Accordingly, this symposium essay identifies the incentives, benefits, and pitfalls of
outsourcing funding to set the agenda for future research.
I.
THE FUNDING PROBLEM IN ISSUE CLASSES

Plenary class certification has become increasingly less
likely in a host of substantive areas ranging from employment
discrimination to products liability. In a recent article, I suggested that issue classes under Rule 23(c) (4) could circumvent
the mismatch between private attorneys' regulatory reach in
light of stricter certification standards and a defendant's nationwide conduct.8 Currently, even when a defendant acts uniformly, concerns over a plaintiffs eligibility for relief inject
variances that may prompt individual questions to
predominate over common ones. But issue classes as to a defendant's conduct-what a defendant knew, when the defendant knew it, whether a defendant used a biased hiring procedure or compensation policy, for example-can refocus the
court's attention on what actually connects the plaintiffs for
adjudicative purposes. 9
6. Roy Storm, Numbers Never Lie-Or Do They?, CHI. LAw. (Feb. 2016)
http://www.chicagolawyermagazine.com/Archives/201 5/02/LitigationFunding-Business.aspx (citing profit increases from a number of third-party
lenders, but noting certain risks facing the industry).
7. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. RLv. 1273, 1277 (2012) [hereinafter Burch, Financiers as
Monitors]; Samuel Issacharoff, LitigationFunding and the Problem of Agency Cost
in Representative Actions, 63 DEPAUL L. REv. 561, 566 (2014).
8. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (4); Burch, Constructing Issue Classes, supra

note 1.
9. See Burch, ConstructingIssue Classes, supra note 1, at 1871-81.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Business

NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS

[Vol. 12:889

Issue classes may likewise better serve class members than
settlement classes, where courts certify a class for settlement
purposes only.10 In their quest for certification in the current
anti-class landscape, plaintiffs' attorneys may winnow the constellation of claims they seek to certify, and 'litigate' with an
all-encompassing aim toward resolution via a settlement class
action. Settlements classes can tip the balance of power in the
defendants' favor: plaintiffs gain settlement leverage by credibly threatening trial, and without plenary class certification,
they lose that bargaining chip. The defendant, on the other
hand, has the "power of a monopolistic purchaser of res judicata" and can shop around for the best deal by negotiating
with other plaintiffs' lawyers who would welcome settlement
and the attorneys' fees that accompany it.11 Settlement classes
might also mean that the court never hears or adjudicates the
dispute's merits. 12 If cases lack adversarial litigation before settling, then the judge is at an informational disadvantage in acting as a check on collusive deals. These circumstances create a
risk that settlement classes will undervalue class members'
13
claims.
Issue classes, on the other hand, may strengthen the rela14
tionship between a claim's merits and its final disposition.
First, plaintiffs' attorneys currently tend to leave valuable
claims on the table that endanger plenary class certification.
Allowing attorneys to target the defendant's conduct directly
10. See, e.g., In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL
No. 2047, 2013 WL 499474, at *11 (E.D. La. Feb. 7, 2013) (certifying settle-

ment class actions); In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration
Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 8:1OML2151JVS (FMOx),
2012 WL 7802852 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012) (provisionally certifying a national settlement class for economic-loss cases).
11. Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO.

WASH. L. REv. 951, 953 (2014); see also Creative Montessori Learning Ctrs. v.
Ashford Gear LLC, 662 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2011) ("[W]e and other
courts have often remarked the incentive of class counsel, in complicity with
the defendant's counsel, to sell out the class . .

").

12. Erichson, supra note 11, at 953. Courts consider the merits only insofar as the), overlap with the certification requirements. Sce Amgen, Inc. v.
Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194-95 (2013). The move
away from the merits is not just limited to class actions. See Arthur R. Miller,
Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Tyials on the Me, its. Reflections
on the Deformation of FederalProcedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 286, 357-60 (2013).
13. See Erichson, supra note 11, at 953.
14. See Burch, ConstructingIssue Classes, supra note 1, at 1916-19.
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without worrying about a plaintiff's eligibility for relief may encourage them to assert the full panoply of claims available to
class members. That, in turn, can further substantive goals.
Second, issue classes restore plaintiffs' ability to credibly
threaten to try the case, and thus strengthen their bargaining
position. Finally, vigorous litigation over the certification question and the potential class-wide trial can equip judges with
merits-related information that they can use to evaluate the
fairness of any eventual settlement.
Despite the upside, issue classes face a substantial funding
hurdle. In plenary classes, restitution theories justify paying
class attorneys: a class member who benefits from a class settlement will be unjustly enriched at counsel's expense unless
counsel receives a reasonable fee. 15 Similarly, in issue classes,
lawyers confer a substantial benefit on class members by successfully advancing the litigation. 16 But there is a catch-the
common-fund doctrine typically requires a fund that "consists
of money or other property" before class members must con17
tribute to the attorney's costs of securing it.
For many issue classes, establishing a common fund after
a successful class-wide trial on the defendant's conduct will be
a non-issue. Once they survive dispositive motions and become
certified classes, many will settle collectively in the same court
and thereby create a common fund.1 8 Common funds have
15. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) ("The common fund doctrine reflects the traditional practice in courts of equity and it
stands as a well recognized enception to the general principle that requires
every litigant to bear his own attorney's fees."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 29 cmt. c (2011) ("Class counsel assumes for this purpose the role of restitution claimant; the restitution claim
isasserted hy th counsel agairst the clAss. Cnupse-.
asserts that the cl-ss will
be unjustly enriched, at counsel's expense, unless a reasonable fee is
awarded from the common fund."); Charles Silver, A Restitutionaiy Theory of
Attorneys'Fees in Class Actions, 76 CORNELL L. Rrv. 656, 663-66 (1991).
16. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §2.09 cmt. c (AM.
LAw INST. 2010) ("The lawyers in the aggregate proceeding will have conferred a substantial benefit on claimants insofar as that preclusive effecti in a
given instance, inures to their advantage in other proceedings.").
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 29(1), cmt. a (2011); ALAN HIRSCH & DIANE SHEEHEY, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES AND MANAGING FEE LITIGATION 61 (2005).
18. Burch, Constructing Issue Classes, supra note 1, at 1889 ("[C]ertifying
an issue class should not become a backdoor to plenary certification via a

settlement class action."). If an issue class settles after it was certified, then
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materialized in high-profile issue class successes and failures
such as Engle and the Blood Products Litigation.1 9 When a common fund exists and the certifying court retains jurisdiction
over that fund, class attorneys' fees can proceed conventionally.
Even if no common fund exists immediately, some subsequent proceedings will still be straightforward. When federal
courts litigate federal questions that would entitle class members to considerable damages, plaintiffs' attorneys have every
incentive to recruit and represent claimants in additional proceedings. McReynolds is a prototypical illustration: once the district court used an issue class to determine whether Merrill
Lynch's teaming and account distribution policies violated Title VII, each class member would then have to prove eligibility
for relief, but because most brokers "earn[ed] at least
$100,000 a year," individual suits were possible. 20 Plus, those
claims would continue in the same court that certified the issue class. Figure 1 illustrates this possibility.

the judge must conduct a separate Rule 23 analysis as to the settlement class.

Id.
19. Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., Order Granting Petition of Class
Counsel for Attorneys Fees, Case No. 94-08273 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2008); DEBORAH
R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
PRIVATE GAIN 304-06 (2000); E-mail from Stanley Rosenblatt, Howard Engle's Attorney, to Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, A,sociate Professor of Law,
University of Georgia College of Law (Sept. 11, 2014, 2:33 p.m. EST) (on file
with author). For more on how these cases settled, see Burch, Constructing
Issue Classes, supra note 1, at 1907.

20. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d
482, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2012).
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FIGURE 1: ISSUE-CLASS CONFIGURATION IN MULTI-DISTRICT
LITIGATION
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Issue classes may likewise prove useful in multidistrict litigation, where many plaintiffs sue and the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation (the Panel) aggregates them for pretrial purposes. Because the authorizing statute requires only a
single common question of fact,21 oftentimes proof of eligibility components (specific causation, reliance, damages, etc.)
differ and can undermine plenary certification. When plaintiffs rely on a common body of evidence to establish a defendant's conduct, litigating those questions collectively through
an issue class can materially advance the resolution of all plain22
tiffs' claims, as well as claims by those who have not yet sued.
There is, however, little to no precedent for awarding fees
once counsel successfully litigates an issue class in multidistrict
litigation, and the remaining issues must be remanded for
trial. There are two principal concerns that arise: (1) meritorious claims that are too expensive to pursue individually may
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
22. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §§ 2.02(a) (1),

2.02 cmt. a, 2.08, 2.08 cmt. a (Am. LAw INST. 2010); McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008) (requiring issue classes to "materially advance the litigation"); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468,
472-73 (5th Cir. 1986) ("It is difficult to imagine that class jury findings on
the class questions [regarding the state-of-the-art defense] will not significantly advance the resolution of the underlying hundreds of cases."); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.24 (2004) (suggesting that aggregate treatment should "materially advance [ ] the disposition of the litigation as a whole").
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be abandoned; and (2) there may be no common fund. Multiple attorneys further complicate the matter. While issue-class
counsel will have contributed to the outcome with issue preclusion, a plaintiff may have a different attorney who litigates
her case upon remand, which raises questions about fee splitting. If issue-class counsel materially advances the class members' claims by establishing a defendant's conduct components, then she has conferred a substantial, issue-preclusive
benefit. Failing to compensate her when plaintiffs cash in on
that preclusive effect through a successful settlement or verdict would unjustly enrich the plaintiffs at class counsel's expense. Figure 2 illustrates potential attorney-client relationships post-remand.
FIGURE

2: FOLLOW-ON PROCEEDINGS POsT-MDL REMAND

*Individual

*Individual

attorney,
Law firm 2

attorney,
Law firm 3

Individual

*Individual
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Lawfirm 5 ......
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attorney,
Law fin.4

There are some existing doctrines that help ease this tension, such as charging liens and the common-benefit doctrine. 23 In most states, charging liens permit attorneys to assert
liens against a client's cause of action when they invest labor
and resources into the client's case and help produce a successful judgment or settlement. 24 The lien attaches upon filing
23. For more detail on these doctrines, see Burch, ConstructingIssue Classes, supra note 1, at 1908-16.
24. E.g., Froelich v. Graham, 80 S.W.3d 360, 363 (Ark. 2002); Musikoff v.
Jay Parrino's The Mint, LLC, 796 A.2d 866, 869-70 (N.J. 2002) ("An attorney's statutory lien attaches broadly to any 'verdict, report, decision, award,
judgment or final order in his [or her] client's favor, and the proceeds
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the initial case and accompanies the claim through judgment.
Translated into the issue-class context, filing the class complaint (the cause of action) would trigger class counsel's lien
if: (1) counsel successfully litigated the issue; (2) the issue class

inured to the plaintiffs' benefit through preclusion; and (3)
the plaintiff-class member ultimately received a favorable judgment or settlement award. 25 The court conducting the followon proceedings could then apportion fees to class counsel26and
individual counsel based on quantum-meruit principles.
The common-benefit doctrine complements the common-fund doctrine in cases where no common fund exists but

plaintiffs' attorneys successfully litigate declaratory or injunctive relief.27 In these cases, the common-benefit doctrine permits attorneys' fees when the litigation confers "a substantial
benefit on the members of an ascertainable class, and where
the court's jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit makes
possible an award that will operate to spread the costs proportionately among them. ' 28 If plaintiffs' attorneys establish conduct components through an issue class and materially ad-

thereof in whosesoever hands they may come."'); RACHEL M. KANE, 7 AM.
JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 318 (2014); RACHEL KANE ET AL., 7A CJ.S. Attorney
& Client § 446 (2014); ROBERT L. Rossi, 2 ATrOu.NEYS' FEES § 12:13 (3d ed.

2014).
25. Constructive liens generally follow "the judgment into whatever form
it may assume." Froelich, 80 S.W.3d at 363; see also Trickett v. Laurita, 674
S.E.2d 218, 229 (W. Va. 2009) (noting that a charging lien "follows the proceeds, wherever they may be found").
Northern Pueblos Enters. v. Montgomery, 644 P.2d 1036,
26. See, e.g.,
1038 (N.M. 1982) ("Because a court eaercises its equitable powers in enforc.ing an attorney's charging lien, it may inquire into the reasonableness of the
asserted fee for purposes of enforcing the lien."); People v. Keeffe, 405
N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y. 1980) ("Generally, however, if an attorney is discharged without cause he will be allowed a charging lien upon the proceeds
of the lawsuit, the amount to be determined on a quantum meruit basis at
the conclusion of the case."); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,JudgingMultidistrict
Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 71, 125-35 (2015) [hereinafter Burch, Judging
MultidistrictLitigation].

27. Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 975 F. Supp. 802, 806 (E.D. Va. 1997)
("[A]n award of attorney's fees and expenses under the common benefit
doctrine does not depend on the specific nature of the relief granted the
plaintiff. Indeed, a fee award may be predicated on the grant of either monetary or equitable relief."); HIRSCH & SHEEHEY, supra note 17, at 83-84.

28. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 393-94 (1970); see also Allen,
975 F. Supp. at 806 (citing Mitts).
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vance the class members' claims, then counsel has conferred a
substantial, issue-preclusive benefit.
Both the common-benefit doctrine and charging liens
present difficulties for a transferee judge in multidistrict litigation who seeks to compensate issue-class counsel where no
common fund exists. Several issues arise in this unique context.
First, to what extent can a transferee judge who certifies
an issue class retain jurisdiction to award counsel's fees once
the Panel remands cases to transferor courts? While precedent
on this point is limited, under the plain language of section
1407, transferee judges could suggest that the Panel separate
fees before remanding, which would allow transferee judges to
make fee decisions. 29 In practice, the Panel has made this allowance for claims that benefit from uniform and consistent
rulings, such as punitive damages. 30 Although attorneys' fees,
like punitive damages, are not standalone claims, courts have
recognized that "the meaning of 'claim' is not so circumscribed" so as to include only a cause of action, 31 which suggests that transferee judges might retain jurisdiction over fee
awards.
On the other hand, allowing the transferee court to preside over fees after remand (and presumably post-trial) may
run afoul of both section 1407 and the Supreme Court's Lexecon opinion. 32 As Lexecon explains, a transferee court's authority is limited to "pretrial" rulings and section 1407 "obligates
the Panel to remand any pending case to its originating court
when, at the latest, those pretrial proceedings have run their
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (allowing the Panel to "separate any
claim" and "remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action is
remanded").
30. Eg., In re Wilson, 451 F.3d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that the
transferee judge refused to remand to ensure "uniform and consistent application of detailed medical criteria" to opt outs); In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809,
810 (3d Cir. 2000) (severing punitive damages); In re Roberts, 178 F.3d 181,
184 (3d Cir. 1999) (severing punitive damages); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab.
Litig. (No. VI), MDL No. 875, 2014 WL 3353044, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. July 9,
2014) ("When a case is remanded, it is the Court's regular practice to sever
an)' claims for punitive or exemplary damages and retain jurisdiction over
these claims in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.").
31. In re Collins, 233 F.3d at 811.
32. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26
(1998).
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course." 33 Attorneys' fees are post-resolution issues. Rule
23(h), which governs class counsel's fee, requires that counsel
move for fees "no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment," and that judges state their factual findings and legal
conclusions in accordance with Rule 52(a).14 While transferee
judges would be intimately familiar with issue-class counsel's
effort, without a settlement before remand, they could not
make factual findings as to individual counsel's post-remand
efforts. 35 While efficiency and public policy may counsel in
favor of allowing transferee judges to retain jurisdiction over
36
fees, neither proved persuasive in Lexecon.
Second, if the courts of origin must apportion fees, those
judges may be less familiar with issue-class counsel's effort and
fees could lack uniformity. 37 Moreover, some states' charging-.
lien statutes contain peculiarities like notifying the claimant
about the lien in advance 38 or requiring contracts between the
attorneys and clients. 39 There are ways to overcome these ob40
stacles, like including lien information in the class notice,
but requiring issue-class attorneys to have a direct contractual
relationship with class members could inhibit fee recovery
from clients in a minority of states. 4' Yet, even in those states,
class counsel can recover fees from a class member's individual
attorney on a quantum-meruit basis if the matter concludes

33. Id. at 34-35.
34. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(h); FED. R. CIv. P. 54(d)(2).
35. FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a).

36. Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 32.
37. Some states attach charging liens only to the judgment. E.g., Howell
v. Howell, 365 S.E.2d 181, 183 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) ("A charging lien is not
available until there is a final judgment or decree to which the lien can attach."). Even if the lien attaches to the cause of action, fees cannot be apportioned until the case concludes, which could happen in the transferor court.
38. E.g., Thompson v. Montgomery & Andrews, P.A., 816 P.2d 532,
534-35 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
39. California is one such example. Carroll v. Interstate Brands Corp.,
121 Ca. Rptr. 2d 532, 534-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) ("Because an attorney's
lien is not automatic and requires a contract for its creation, a direct contractual relationship between the attorney and the client is essential.").
40. For notice to be timely, it generally must take place before the lawsuit
ends in judgment or settlement. Levine v. Gonzalez, 901 So. 2d 969 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
41. Carroll, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 534-35.
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successfully. 42 Still, that takes time and persistence, which is
not reimbursable on a billable-hour rate. Because remand itself is rare, transferor courts have not devised a uniform
method for handling those cases. In the asbestos cases, for example, some courts have placed trial-ready, remanded cases at
the end of their docket. 43 This not only extracts an extraordinary toll on plaintiffs, but further prolongs an already protracted payday for their lawyers.
To overcome these hurdles within the current system,
before remanding, transferee judges could issue interlocutory
orders placing class members within presumptive fee categories (settlement immediately upon remand versus a subsequent trial on eligibility components, for example) .4 4 Although transferee judges would lack both full information and
jurisdiction to decide final fee awards, this approach is pragmatic. First, it lends some uniformity and predictability to fees
subsequently awarded in dispersed transferor courts. Second,
it provides some security for issue-class attorneys who might be
hesitant to undertake the endeavor for fear their payday may
never come. Because transferor judges must afford interlocutory orders some deference under the law-of-the-case doc-

42. Id.; Trimble v. Steinfeldt, 224 Cal. Rptr. 195, 197-98 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986).
43. Participant, Mass-Tort MDL Program for Judicial Conference Committees, Oct. 8, 2015, https://law.duke.edu/judicialstudies/conferences/october2015/.
44. Certifying courts have general authority to award fees under Rule
23(h). The Eighth Circuit has also ruled that "[i]t is well established that
courts can impose liability for court-appointed counsel's fees on all plaintiffs
benefitting from their services." Walitalo v. Iacocca, 968 F.2d 741, 747 (8th
Cir. 1992).
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trine, 45 clear-error standards, 46 or comity, 47 they should not revisit the presumptive allocation categories absent changed circumstances. Finally, because issue-class counsel cannot control
how others handle remanded cases, this approach incentivizes
class counsel to inform and represent as many individual clients as possible. This may make smaller claims more economical to litigate on remand, prompt careful notice to class members, and ensure faithful agency so long as no structural con48
flicts exist between clients.
II.
ENTER THIRD-PARTY FUNDING?

While it is possible to navigate the current system's constraints without it, the question remains as to whether thirdparty financing could play a beneficial role in funding issue
classes. Just as law firms aggregate clients, financiers could aggregate attorneys or clients, too, depending on the nature of
the funding relationship. The funder's ability to work across
multiple law firms gives it the ability to follow disaggregated
litigation to its originating forum in a way that issue-class counsel can't unless the same firm represents all the plaintiffs.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate how external financing might change
the funding relationship by backing firms that lack intra-firm
agreements dictating fee sharing and capital contributions.

45. See, e.g., In reFord Motor Co., 591 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2009) (using law
of the case to determine transferor court's deference to transferee court's
orders); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 256, 273-75
(E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.133 (4th ed.
2004) (suggesting that the transferor judge can vacate or modify rulings by
the transferee judge subject to "law of the case" considerations, but that
transferor courts should not do so absent a significant change in the circumstances because it would frustrate the purpose of centralization).
46. See, e.g., Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 09-C6610, 2014 WL 258154 (N.D. Ill.
2014); Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 975 F. Supp.
2d 1351, 1351 (N.D. Ga. 2013).
47. E.g., Guddeck v. SmithKline Beecham Corp, 34 F. Supp. 3d 990, 997
(D. Minn. 2014) (suggesting that the law-of-the-case doctrine is inapplicable
to interlocutory orders but nonetheless noting that "considerations of comity and judicial economy weigh against disturbing [a transferor] court's rulings" and applying a similar standard as In reFordMotor Corp., 591 F.3d 406).
48. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a) (A.L.I.
2010) (defining structural conflicts).
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In theory, meritorious claims that are too expensive to
pursue individually on remand would receive continued funding from a financier who stands to gain not only in that particular case but from the spillover effect it has on others like it.
As such, the information sharing and collective wisdom gained
through consolidation need not end when formal centralization concludes. The funder's ability to coordinate resources
and aggregate information across clients and law firms can advantage plaintiffs in several ways.
First, if a single funding company financed disaggregated
claimants' continued litigation in transferor courts, it could
combat a defendant's divide-and-conquer strategy. That strategy is currently working to the defendants' advantage in remanded asbestos cases. Berkshire Hathaway, under its various
subsidiaries, has purchased the reinsurance obligations for asbestos claims and is reportedly delaying and refusing to settle
particularly with law firms that have fewer cases. 49 According
49. See William Powell Co. v. Nat'l Indem. Co., No. 1:14-cv-807, 2015 WL
5729381 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2015) (dismissing a complaint describing various defense tactics that subsidiaries of Berkshire Hathaway have used in the

asbestos context); Brief for Resolute Management Inc. as Amicus Curiae
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to the lawsuits filed over these practices, the company pursues
aggressive delay and payment reduction strategies like low-ball
offers that give the company time to invest the "float"-the
money it holds from policy payments before holders make
claims. 50 When the company settles, it does so cheaply and
then uses that reduced price point as the new going rate even
for law firms with a larger inventory of asbestos claims. 5' De-

fendants have purportedly pursued a similar strategy even
within consolidation: in the trans-vaginal mesh cases, the largest set of multidistrict proceedings since asbestos, defendants
are rumored to be settling cases in bulk and on the cheap. A
plaintiff's firm with just a few cases must pay the lead lawyers to
package its cases with many others like them before the defendants will discuss settlement. If a financier backed all of the
cases, it stands to reason that it could cut these "pay-to-deal"
costs as well as negate a defendant's divide-delay-and-diminish
strategy.
Second, financiers could reduce costs within the pretrial
aspects of issue classes. When lead lawyers conduct discovery in
multidistrict litigation or assign it to their law-firm allies, there
Supporting Petitioners, Travelers Indemn. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137 (2009)
(No. 08-295), 2009 WL 271048 ("Resolute Management Inc. is the administrative arm of the Berkshire Hathaway Insurance Group's run-off operation.
The primary business activity of the run-off operation is the assumption of
other insurers' liabilities arising from their discontinued lines of business
..

.

. The long-tail insurance liabilities assumed under these transactions

include liabilities related to asbestos exposure ....); Mark Greenblatt, Berkshire Hathaway Subsidiaries Deny, Delay Asbestos, Hazard Claims, Suits, Insiders

Allege, ScRiPPs NEws, (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.wptv.com/news/localnews/investigations/berkshire-hathaway-subsidiaries-deny-delay-asbestoshazard-claims-suits-insiders-allege_20140102230128180.
50. Greenblatt, supra note 49. See generally Paul Walker-Bright et al., Policy
Holders with Long-Tail Claims Under Liberty Mutual Policies Should Be Preparedfor

'Sea Change' in Claims HandlingAfter Berkshire Hathaway, REED SMITH CLIENT
(July 19, 2014) ("The longer it takes to pay claims, the longer the
money can be invested and the greater the profit."), https://
www.reedsmith.com/Policyholders-with-Long-Tail-Claims-Under-Liberty-Mutual-Policies-Should-Be-Prepared-for-Sea-Change-in-Claims-Handling-AfterBerkshire-Hathaway-Deals-07-18-2014/.
51. See Greenblatt, supra note 49 ("Asbestos defendants often drag out
court proceedings, Accurso said-a strategy he called 'delay, deny until they
ALERTS

die."'). But see Chad Hemenway, Berkshire Hathaway:Asbestos Claims-Handling
Story, Inaccurate,Misleading, PRop. CASUALTY 360.coM (Nov. 1, 2013) (disput-

ing Greenblatt's account), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/
01/berkshire-hathaway-asbestos-claims-handling-story.
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is an incentive to perform that service in-house. Document review can generate billable hours for attorneys, which are eventually paid with the profit baked into the hourly rate. That
means that firms are less likely to outsource review overseas to
a legal process vendor that could perform the service at less
expense to plaintiffs. 52 Such vendors require only attorney supervision; the vendor's work constitutes a litigation expense
and is reimbursed at cost, thereby providing substantial savings
to plaintiffs. 5 3 Where financiers footing the bill might rely on
those services to keep costs down, law firms would prefer to
profit from the billable hours.
Third, like other repeat players such as plaintiffs' lawyers,
financiers will develop a vast knowledge about the myriad layers of administrative service providers that surround multidistrict proceedings, some of whom may renege on their price
structuring and deliverables. These include document warehousing services and claims administrators. 54 Because some of
these auxiliary services relate to a lawsuit's conclusion, such as
claims processing that could occur post-issue class through a
private settlement, there is little regulatory or judicial oversight. As repeat players, financiers could use their size and the
promise of future business as extralegal carrots and sticks. As
such, they might negotiate reduced prices and incentivize
providers to follow through on their commitments. Moreover,
publically traded financiers who have to divulge their expenditures might be less susceptible to providers' enticements-wining, dining, and offers of all-expense-paid trips-and more attune to their bottom-line bid.
Finally, even if a third-party financier lacks a relationship
with the law firms handling the remanded cases, it has the
means, incentive, and specialization to pursue its compensation. In that way, when issue-class members' cases settle or end
in a favorable judgment in their originating courts, a financier
52. See Morris A. Ratner & William B. Rubenstein, Profit for Costs, 63
DEPAUL L. REv. 587, 603-04 (2014) (discussing functions that nonlawyers

can perform under attorney supervision such as work coding and searching
discovery documents, but noting that paying attorneys more for their time
incentivizes them not to outsource work in a cost-effective manner).
53. Id.
54. E.g., BRowNGREER, http://browngreer.com; GARRrTSON, http://www
.garretsongroup.com; PROVIDIo, http://www.providiomedisolutions.com;
Rusr CONSULTING, http://www.rustconsulting.com.
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can recoup and profit from the benefit issue-class counsel conferred.

55

In many respects, one might categorize funders' benefits
in issue classes under the umbrella of "monitoring." They perform a similar role to institutional investors in securities class
actions as described in Elliott Weiss and John Beckerman's article, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How InstitutionalInvestors
Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions. 56 Weiss and

Beckerman suggested that sophisticated, institutional investors
with the most at stake-and thus the most incentive to monitor class counsel-should serve as lead plaintiffs in securities
class actions. Like institutional investors, financiers possess the
legal acumen and financial impetus to perform this role. But
much of the monitoring and the aforementioned upsides depend on the incentive structure underpinning the funding relationship. For example, if financiers simply serve as stand-ins
for banks, substituting only their willingness to view pending
suits as assets and loaning money directly to law firms on a
recourse basis with higher interest rates, then that does little to
improve the status quo. In fact, the arrangement may be more
harmful: higher interest rates paid by the law firm may prompt
the firm to try to pass those costs on to clients or absent class
members and cut further into their recovery, or it may amplify
the pressure on attorneys to settle quickly and cheaply.
In 2011, I wrote an article titled Financiers as Monitors in
Aggregate Litigation,5 7 which suggested ways in which funders
might allay some of the skepticism that still surrounds them by
changing the nature of the funding relationship. Instead of
compounding pressure on attorneys to settle-maybe in ways
that disserve their clients-financiers could play the role that
Weiss and Beckerman envisioned for institutional investors: so55. To be sure, alternative-financing regimes can confer other benefits as
well. They might, for example, help women overcome barriers to multidistrict litigation leadership roles. Amanda Bronstad, In Mass Torts-Move over,
Mister,NAT'L L.J., Feb. 16, 2015 ("A major reason for the shortage of women
on the plaintiffs side is money."). Others writing in this area have ably identified these advantages, so I will not rehash them here.
56. ElliottJ. Weiss &John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring:
How InstitutionalInvestors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities ClassActions, 104

L.J. 2053, 2109 (1995). Their work lead Congress to enact the PSLRA.
S. REP. No. 104-98, at 11 n.32 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,
690.

YALE

57. Burch, Financiersas Monitors, supra note 7.
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phisticated monitors. In a nutshell, I suggested that, in nonclass aggregation, lenders could contract directly with the
plaintiffs for a portion of their proceeds, much like attorneys
do now in contingent-fee litigation. Instead of fronting the
money to plaintiffs for their daily living expenses as consumer
legal funding does, the funder would use that money to finance the lawsuit on a nonrecourse basis and pay plaintiffs'
chosen attorneys on a billable-hour rate plus a small percentage of the gross proceeds as a successful litigation bonus. The
change from contingent fees to billable hours alters attorneys'
motivations: if a financier pressed for a quick settlement, the
attorney's self-interest in continued billables would counterbalance the financier's push. Billable hours encourage lawyers
to spend time advising clients about the risks of litigating versus settling and alleviate the financial strain that drives attorneys to pressure their clients to settle in contingent-fee cases.
Of course, this model would require some tinkering to
adapt it to class actions. While financiers might still contract
directly with known issue-class members who initiated claims
in multidistrict litigation, tailoring the funding relationship for
absent class members-particularly those in small-claims classes-would require considering whether the named representatives could authorize funding agreements on the class's behalf. Still, one need not write on an entirely blank slate. Australia-with its loser-pays and no-contingency fee system-has
58
permitted funders to contract directly with class members.
Despite the possibilities, financiers have not stepped into
the monitoring role. 59 Even if funders were theoretically willing to serve as monitors, there may be significant drawbacks.
First, doctrinal hurdles exist-some seem like ancient relics,
ready to be cast aside, while others require careful consideration. For instance, historical doctrines like champerty and barratry if taken seriously would ban not only third-party funding,
58. Deborah R. Hensler, Third-Party Financingof Class Action Litigation in
the United States: Will the Sky Fall?, 63 DEPAUL L. REv. 499, 518-24 (2014);
Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 569--72. Financiers in Australia have also defined
the class based on the funding relationship.
59. Financiers have not followed the funding blueprint I suggested in
Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, though they have funded law
firms who initiate class actions. See, e.g., Samson Habte; Litigation Funding
ContractDidn't Violate Ethics Rules, 84 U.S. L. WK, BLOOMBERG BNA, Sept. 15,
2015.
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but class actions, too, for the class promotes "officious intermeddling in a suit that belongs to no one" and "excites and
stirs up suits and quarrels." 60 More pressing concerns about
deterring wrongdoing and equitably compensating large plaintiff groups have long trumped those antiquated deontological
and professional anxieties. Yet, weightier questions arise with
regard to notice and consent to third-party funding in class
actions. Depending on the nature of the funding relationship,
courts, parties, and financiers may have to consider the implications of and parameters for absent class members' consent
to the funding arrangement,61 as well as whether financiers
are allowed to communicate with class members.
Second, ironing out doctrinal concerns does little to
change funders' basic desire to retain decision-making control
over their investment-including when and whether to settle. 62 Like attorneys who view contingent fees across multiple
cases as diversifying risk, 6 3 settlements fund future investments
for financiers, too. So, publically traded financiers might pressure plaintiffs to settle early to report a higher quarterly
profit. 64 Moreover, in product-liability cases that give rise to
personal injury, financiers could erode what little autonomy
plaintiffs have in conducting their suit.6 5 While an issue class
does some of that already, plaintiffs still retain control over the
subsequent handling of their case including when and
66
whether to settle.

60. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES § 143, 2311 (William Carey
Jones, ed. 1916).
61. Hensler, supra note 58, at 515 ("Under Rule 23(e)(1), the judge
could direct that the notice to class members of a pending settlement include the terms of the litigation financing agreement so that class members
would understand how their share of the settlement would be affected by

these terms. and either have the chance to object to the terms or opt out,").
62. Burch, Financiers as Monitors, supra note 7, at 1320-24; Issacharoff,
supra note 7, at 575.
63. HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REwARDs: CONTINGENcY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2004).
64. Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REv. 1268, 1319 (2011).
65. In nonclass aggregation, I have argued that this problem can be mitigated in various ways. Burch, Financiersas Monitors, supra note 7, at 1322.
66. For an in-depth analysis of general control issues, see Anthony J.
Sebok, What Do We Talk About When We Talk About Control?, 82 Foro-rA-M L.
REv. 2939 (2014).
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Third, as Sam Issacharoff has explained, "one of the veritable truths of life is that every gatekeeper in life will at some
point become a toll collector." 67 In securities class actions, for
instance, the lead-plaintiff provision gave rise to pay-to-play
practices where plaintiffs' law firms contributed to the political
campaigns of those selecting counsel for public or labor pension funds. 68 The same potential for complicity exists here:
both funders and class attorneys are repeat players, whereas
plaintiffs (in multidistrict litigation) and absent class members
are one-shotters. Even if financiers could contract directly with
issue-class members, the reality is that the attorney would be
the one referring clients to the financier in the first place. Attorneys' preferred funders may depend more on the hourly
rate and percentage of the proceeds the financier will pay
them than the clients' best interests. This raises the potential
for repeaters-financiers and lawyers-to collude to their mutual benefit. 69 Granted, class actions contain built-in due process protections and judicial oversight that might uncover or
deter collusive deals. 70 But that largely returns us to the status
quo. Still, funding agreements may be more transparent than
intra-firm agreements, which are sometimes nothing more
than numerical fee splits jotted down on paper napkins or
handshake deals.
Finally, a host of practical problems exist from the
funder's perspective, too. First, unlike Australia's loser-pays,
no-contingent-fee system, a small concentration of well-heeled
71
plaintiffs' law firms already occupies the class-action market.
Newer market entrants might turn to third-party financiers, as
might established firms contemplating an issue class. Law
firms could worry about a slippery slope and the erosion of
their market dominance. Second, depending on how much
67. Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 581.
68. StephenJ. Choi, Drew T.Johnson-Skinner & A.C. Pritchard, The Price
of Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions, 8 J. EMPIIcAL LEGAL STUD. 650, 653
(2011); Drew T. Johnson-Skinner, Paying-to-Play in Securities Class Actions: A
Look at Lawyers' Campaign Contributions,84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1725, 1726 (2009).
69. Steinitz, supra note 64, at 1325. But see Hensler, supra note 58, at 516
(noting that funding would have to be disclosed in connection with Rule
23(e) (3), that such agreements would attract attention, and that the attention "would likely constrain class counsel and third party litigation investors
from agreeing to terms that were clearly against class members' interest").
70. Hensler, supra note 58, at 516.
71. Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 577-78.
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financiers can communicate with issue-class members, if lawyers referred cases in bulk to a financier, it may be difficult to
screen the strong cases from the weak ones. 72 Funders would
have to rely principally on the attorney's reputation. Finally,
because issue classes in product-liability and personal-injury
cases present differing damages for individuals, funders may
prefer to invest in cases where they can easily assess damages in
73
the aggregate, such as antitrust or securities classes.
CONCLUSION

Whether the benefits outweigh these burdens remains to
be seen. With funding changes on the horizon,7 4 it is time we
moved past the caricatures of white knights and Wall-Street
barons to consider how to align third-party financing both
with class members' best interests and longstanding justice system values. That endeavor entails understanding the current
regulatory landscape. Recent Supreme Court decisions have
deteriorated the likelihood of plenary class certification; yet,
would-be class members are unlikely to fare better in non-class
multidistrict proceedings that present the same principal-agent problems, but lack Rule 23's structural assurances of
fairness. 75 As such, issue classes can offer a coherent path forward. Yet, the potential for issue classes is hampered, in part,
by the uncertainty surrounding recovery for issue-class counsel's efforts. While significant questions persist as to whether
third-party funding is the right fit in its current form, the time
has come to approach these questions holistically. Part of that
undertaking demands that financiers realize that the time has
also come for them to do more than just fund disputes as attorneys do now. Mainstream acceptance requires that they add
value, too.

72. See id., at 574.
73. Id.
74. Nicholas Datlowe, Legislation on the Horizon for Alternative Legal Financiers?, BNA (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.bna.com/legislation-horizon-alternative-n57982058708/.
75. Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 26, at 78-84.
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